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During President’s George Bush’s visit to India in February 2006, the two countries finally 
inked the much-debated civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact [1]. The deal is the first of its 
kind, and given India’s defiance to become a member of the NPT, has caused a stir among the 
non-proliferation lobby. Notwithstanding, both the US and Indian leaderships have remained 
steadfast and continue to maintain that the deal is not only beneficial for their relationship, but 
is also a positive development for the broader non-proliferation agenda. 
Since the deal, a number of aspects of the development have been analysed by various 
quarters both within and outside South Asia. However, much of the debate seems to have 
ignored the shear breadth of the implications of this deal. Analyses thus far have tended to 
focus predominantly on most immediate concerns. In order to force the realisation of the 
broad ranging impact of this development, there is a need to undertake a holistic analysis. 
There are three points that remain key: First, how will this deal impact the major stakeholders 
and issues of international concern (non-proliferation, etc)? Second, how is Pakistan likely to 
respond to the development? Third, what does the Indo-US deal signify in its terms of the 
make-up of the geo-strategic alliances in the South Asian region over the medium term? All 
these questions are tackled briefly below. However, they are prefaced with a succinct overview 
of the deal itself.  
Elements of the Indo-US nuclear deal 
The Indo-US nuclear deal is a landmark achievement for both countries as the two leaderships 
have managed to defy heavy odds to push it through. The deal is far reaching in that it required 
changes in a number of US and international laws (these issues are discussed later).  
In essence, the deal allows the US to provide civilian nuclear technology to India, while 
India agrees to a number of stipulations designed to ensure that the technology or nuclear 
material is not siphoned off to its weapons program. On India’s part, the major obligations 
include separating its civilian and military nuclear programs and opening the civilian programs 
to the international monitoring agencies. The military program as well as stockpiles of nuclear 
fuels that India possessed at the time of the deal are exempt from any of these stipulations. 
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This is followed up by the requirement to sign an additional protocol to allow IAEA intrusive 
inspections of its civilian program. In principal, India has also agreed to negotiate possibilities 
for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty with the US. Moreover, India is to continue its nuclear 
testing moratorium, tighten its nuclear arsenal’s security and continue its ‘exceptional’ track 
record in non-proliferation. What India gets in return is dual-use technology, both know-how 
and equipment, which potentially could provide India with enriched uranium to be used in the 
nuclear weapons program [2]. However, as mentioned, under the spirit of the deal, the 
technology ought be used only to complement the civilian program.  
The key question that held the deal back at one time with rumours that the entire 
development may unfold is the extent to which the US was willing to give in on its original 
stance with regard to the actual terms of the deal. The central issue was the separation of the 
Indian civilian and military nuclear programs. The Indians were bent upon having the choice to 
determine which part of the program would be declared as ‘military’ and thus kept outside the 
purview of the deal. Of course, if the list was large enough, virtually the entire program could 
have remained secretive. Apart from the natural desire to maintain secrecy over a large chunk 
of the program, India was concerned that opening up dual-use apparatus to intrusions could 
expose its weapons program as well. This was a well-founded concern since India has never 
had any real separation between its civilian and nuclear programs.  In the final outcome, 
however, India managed a minor coup by having its fast breeder reactors designated as 
military. This was the deal clincher for many Indian strategists who argued that had the fast 
breeder program been brought under the deal’s transparency element, India would have lost an 
important source of plutonium for its military program [3]. As it stands, the terms of the deal 
are highly favourable to India. 
A cost-benefit analysis of the deal in terms of key actors and issues 
There is little doubt that the deal could potentially have far reaching consequences on a 
number of actors in the international arena. While some ‘winners’ can be identified, there are a 
number of actors and existing regimes that fall on the ‘losers’ side of the equation as well. Let 
us begin by underscoring the ‘winners’. The discussion is only limited to the most important 
beneficiaries. 
The winners 
India 
India is the principal beneficiary of this deal. While there are a number of factors that make 
this a significant achievement for the Indian government, perhaps the greatest short-term 
benefit is the legitimacy that India would acquire for its nuclear program. By concluding this 
deal, the US has moved away from self-imposed restraints on transferring nuclear technology, 
treating India as an exception and thus acknowledging the country as a de-facto nuclear power. 
The deal makes India the only country in the world that has a recognised (de facto) nuclear 
status without having entered the global non-proliferation regime. The agreement is both a 
sign of the acknowledgement of India’s responsible nature as a state and recognition of its 
stature to enter the nuclear club.  
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While some Indian analysts were wary of the deal on the grounds that it adds little to 
India’s already declared nuclear status, the fact is that nuclear ‘gate crashers’ like India and 
Pakistan acquire tremendous diplomatic leverage by gaining legitimacy of their nuclear status. 
Consider that both Pakistan and India have been longing to enter the nuclear club through a 
5+2 formula in the NPT. Moreover, in India’s case, another compelling reason to legitimise its 
nuclear status was its aspirations of becoming a global power. The current administration in 
New Delhi seems to have realised that toying with the grey areas of established international 
norms for too long is likely to be a hindrance in the country’s quest to enter the prestigious 
club. That the legitimacy came without having to come under formal legal obligations to 
adhere by all non-proliferation norms is an added bonus. 
As the deal has turned out, there is substantial room for India to manipulate the benefits 
from the US cooperation to gain in the military sphere. After all, the US would be providing 
technology, hardware and raw materials with direct applicability to the weapons program. In an 
extreme scenario, over the long run, the deal gives India the opportunity to significantly 
strengthen its nuclear weapons program by building higher capacity reactors and enhancing the 
targeting efficiency of its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, the de facto legitimacy would also allow 
India to proceed with its controversial nuclear programs under the cover of legitimacy with 
relative ease.  
United States 
One question that seems to have puzzled many is the US interest in pushing this deal through. 
Indeed, there seem to be little short-term gains for Washington. Moreover, there are hardly any 
tangible deal-specific gains one can identify even in the medium to long term. Through this 
deal, the US is solely looking to cement India into its alliance club to satisfy its strategic 
interests in the region. Predominantly, the Indo-US strategic partnership satisfies three US 
objectives: it allows the US to have a reliable ally in South Asia, a long standing interest it has 
failed to achieve with Pakistan; it props up India economically as well as militarily as a 
counterweight to China over the long run; and it satisfies the massive economic interests the 
US sees for itself in India. In essence, the current deal can be seen as an initial signal of 
Washington’s sincerity towards making the Indo-US relationship a lasting one.  
States with nuclear technology know-how 
A key aspect of the debate on the nuclear deal is its impact on the global non-proliferation 
regime. While the non-proliferation regime is a clear loser (we will discuss the adverse 
implications separately), it opens up tremendous avenues for other aspirants looking to share 
nuclear technology know-how for economic gains. Notwithstanding the Bush administration’s 
claims that this deal would prevent further spread of nuclear weapons, the development would 
end up opening avenues for other states to find their own markets.  
On the supply side, the immense economic interest for countries with nuclear 
technological know-how to share dual use technologies is sure to play a role in future decision 
making. On the demand side, the Bush administration’s policy of targeted intervention against 
perceived adversaries and its handling of nuclear versus non-nuclear states (North Korea 
versus Iran for example) has only incentivised the need for developing countries to get their 
hands on dual use technology [4]. The interplay is sure to allow future deals to go through, 
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whether through official exchanges in line with global norms (as the potential Russia-Iran deal 
is shaping up) or through developments, which take advantage of the loopholes in existing 
global regimes.  
One only needs to look back at the history of proliferation in South Asia to predict the 
impact of this deal on future nuclear technology exchange. Despite stringent checks and 
disapproval by the entire international community, both Pakistan and India managed to acquire 
nuclear technological know-how, the required inputs, and eventually a nuclear weapons 
capability. We have already seen nuclear capable countries other than the US (France, Russia) 
showing interest in sharing nuclear technology know-how with India. In the wake of the deal, 
New Delhi made an official request to Australia to relax rules for uranium exports. The 
incidence of such interactions is sure to increase in the future.  
The losers  
Non-proliferation 
By far the greatest implications from this deal are bound to be for the global non-proliferation 
regime. Since 9/11, courtesy of the Bush administration’s policy of pre-emption and varying 
attitudes towards nuclear versus non-nuclear states, controls over the ‘demand’ side of nuclear 
non-proliferation had already been compromised. The real hope for global non-proliferation to 
remain effective was resting on the ‘supply’ side constraints to acquiring nuclear technology. 
The Indo-US nuclear deal has ensured an unravelling of these constraints and consequently 
pushed the global non-proliferation regime even closer to its ultimate demise.  
Consider that the ‘supply’ side of proliferation was functioning at the behest of various 
legally binding protocols. The current nuclear deal necessitates exceptions in all relevant 
international protocols. The US Atomic Energy Act that regulates trade of nuclear material 
does not allow technology transfer to any country not accepting full safeguards. The Congress 
thus had to make an exception for India for the deal to go through. The Nuclear Suppliers 
Group’s multilateral export controls also do not permit such technology transfer. However, the 
NSG, in many ways the key institution responsible for supply controls has now fallen victim to 
the power play within the set-up. The stringency on export controls from the NSG is sure to 
give way in the future. Finally, the deal defies the NPT, the single most important non-
proliferation protocol. The very rationale of the NPT, which allowed peaceful nuclear 
technology in exchange for foregoing nuclear weapons, has been undermined.  
Given the above, it is no surprise that the principal opposition to the deal came from non-
proliferationists around the world (including US and Indian non-proliferation lobbies). The 
opposition camp is correct: once such regimes start to be moulded to benefit a few, others are 
sure to take advantage of the situation. US’ own non-proliferation interests in Iran and North 
Korea are likely to be undermined as they clash with other nuclear suppliers who now sense a 
window of opportunity.  
The key question then becomes if the terms of the deal could have been altered to reverse 
the impact on non-proliferation. Indeed, an analysis of the technical aspects of the deal 
suggests that the non-proliferation concern was deliberately compromised in a quest to cement 
the alliance through this flagship deal. Key non-proliferation attributes could have been 
included in a more transparent deal. First, rather than leaving the need to negotiate on the 
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FMCT open-ended, India should have been asked to cap its fissile material, even if it were 
through a bilateral arrangement. With the current arrangement, India’s indigenous uranium 
stocks will now be freed up for the weapons program. Moreover, the deal could easily have 
separated technologies and hardware that was permissible for sharing and that which could not 
be transferred. Specifically, India could have been given nuclear reactors, uranium and enriched 
fuel but not materials and technology that are more relevant to enrichment, reprocessing, and 
other sensitive fuel-cycles. The current arrangement is one of ‘full cooperation’. Finally, rather 
than creating frameworks which are exceptions to the norm, the non-proliferation community 
should think of altering legal protocols like the NSG and US regulations to allow non-sensitive 
technologies to be transferred to countries genuinely in need of civilian nuclear technology, 
whether members of the NPT or not [5]. Notwithstanding the fact that the entire deal might 
have collapsed if such stipulations were included, the overall impact of the deal might have 
been viewed favourably by non-proliferationists.  
Pakistan 
Pakistan is another major loser from the deal. The legitimacy provided by this deal to India’s 
nuclear program and the resultant diplomatic leverage it has acquired has made Pakistan’s long-
standing quest to avoid becoming a satellite state much harder. Clearly, the deal is a 
tremendous boost for India’s ambitions of becoming a global power. While to date, its conflict 
with Pakistan and its poor track record in Kashmir had evaded the recognition of its status, the 
deal has overhauled the entire scenario in India’s favour. Pakistan, already increasingly seen as a 
troublemaker in the region since Kargil, will find it even harder to sell its view vis-à-vis India. 
The relationship certainly provides added leverage to India on issues such as terrorism and 
extremism where the US, and by extension all Western powers are sure to side with New Delhi 
even more candidly in the future.  
Moreover, stances on certain issues where Pakistan and India previously held converging 
interests will now be altered. NPT is a case in point. While India’s need for a 5+2 formula still 
remains alive, it would now have subsided considerably, at least for the time being. This leaves 
Pakistan alone in the hunt to find a legitimate way into the nuclear club. New Delhi now has 
little incentive to stand on the same platform as Pakistan on the issue.  
Military disparity and nuclear stabilisation  
Strictly within the military context, there is little cause for concern for Islamabad in the short 
run. Over the long run however, the probable scenario will benefit India. The military spin off 
from the nuclear deal (presuming it takes place) will allow India to develop new categories of 
sophisticated weapon systems. The key concern for Pakistan will be the potential acquisition of 
a counter-force capability by India, which would put the former’s military assets at stake in case 
of a conflict. Pakistan, as the weaker adversary, will look to revise its force disparity and 
recalculate its force structure to counter this development. Judging by Pakistan’s traditional 
reaction to such Indian moves, it may attempt to maintain a robust second strike capability, be 
it through quantitative increase in delivery systems and warheads, or through a sea-based 
capability (the latter is by far the preferred though costlier option). In addition, the desire to 
maintain acceptable ratios of conventional force strength will remain.  
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While Pakistan would ideally like to match India, whether it would be able to do so is 
debatable. The more probable outcome is that Pakistan might, despite its utmost efforts, fail to 
maintain the current ratios of asymmetry in its capabilities vis-à-vis India (we will revisit this 
scenario in the next section). Under this scenario, the relationship could become highly 
unstable with India asserting its influence upon a resentful Pakistan [6]. The other possible 
outcome is that both sides continue to upgrade their conventional and nuclear military 
capabilities at an accelerated pace. Under this scenario, the implications would become broader 
than the Indo-Pakistan context. The Indian upgrade will force China to revisit its upgrade 
plans (although China is moving in an aggressive manner on this front regardless), which then 
brings Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific into the picture. Afghanistan and Iran are new entrants into 
the South Asian strategic equation and will also react to these developments.  
The Indo-Pakistan equation 
Having discussed the implications for various actors/issues as a result of the Indo-US nuclear 
deal, we now look at the specific impact the deal is likely to have on Indo-Pak relations. We 
build on the discussion on Pakistan and the military balance above. First, one needs to realise 
that the Indo-US deal is not a stand-alone initiative; it reflects a permanent change in 
Washington’s outlook towards India. The US relationship with India and Pakistan has seesawed 
over the years as Washington has sought to protect and advance its interests in the region. 
Throughout the Cold War, and especially in the 1980s, Pakistan was a frontline US ally. The 
1990s saw a gradual tilt towards India, which climaxed with the Vajpayee-Clinton Joint Vision 
Statement, and Clinton’s subsequent visit to India in 2000. September 11 brought another U-
turn as Washington again co-opted Pakistan as a frontline ally in its War on Terror, much to 
India’s dismay. Now, while the US foreign policy has sought to get rid of the zero-sum 
relationship with India and Pakistan, it has cemented what is potentially a permanent tilt in its 
policy.  
The new Indo-US alliance holds more significance than any previous US policy overture in 
South Asia. The very scope of the Indo-US alliance suggests that cooperation is likely to extend 
in all spheres over the long-term. Acting as a counterweight to China implies that the US is 
willing to augment India’s military as well as economic capabilities. The US has already offered 
a comprehensive defence assistance pact to India. The nuclear technology transfer deal (apart 
from the option of dual use) would provide India respite from its projected energy shortage. 
The Indo-US trade relations are already strong and growing tremendously.  
Contrary to the make up of Indo-US relations, the permanence of the US relationship with 
Pakistan is questionable. In fact, the majority view suggests that while a repeat of the post-
Afghan scenario, where the US completely exited the scene, is unlikely for several reasons, there 
certainly are no structural integration patterns that would force the US to engage Pakistan at the 
same level as India. Skeptics suggest that the real meat in the Pak-US relationship will disappear 
once Pakistan’s importance in the war on terror decreases in the medium term. Others point to 
a fundamental weakness in the relationship, the so-called one-man (Musharraf) policy as 
evidence of the short-lived utility of the alliance [7].  
While much in this analysis is debatable, one fact is hard to challenge: with India, there are 
long-term strategic reasons that compel the US to move closer to New Delhi. The US has 
clearly taken India on a new platform in its relations. As already discussed, in due course this is 
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likely to allow India to create an overwhelming disparity with Pakistan, be it military or 
economic. The resulting equation would be an unstable one.  
Some analysts challenge the above premise by arguing that US determination to transform 
India into a global power will leave Pakistan with little choice but to continue on the path of 
reconciliation with India. This is so because they see Pakistan’s capability to stand up to a US-
backed India as virtually nil. The outcome would be a Pakistan willing to live in peace with its 
neighbor. This argument is flawed. First it ignores the fact that outstanding issues in larger 
conflicts are a result of structural anomalies in the Pakistan-India relationship and certain 
domestic policy formulations. They are not solvable at will. Second, one needs to consider that 
while in a bilateral hostility a state’s policies are affected by disparity in strength, it principally 
remains a function of the level of disparity. A weaker party, which faces overwhelming 
disparity in its relations with a hostile neighbor, will only succumb if it has no other recourse. 
But if it has the space to bolster their strength, it will tend to explore those rather than accept 
hegemony.  
Granted, Pakistan will seek to compromise under the new scenario. However, it will still 
not be able to give in on its principal positions on thorny issues. That requires altering various 
fundamental underpinnings of Indo-Pak relations, be they political, strategic, or cultural. 
Consider that for the past two years the two sides have been sincerely working towards 
rapprochement. Yet there has been virtually no progress on the contentious issues: Kashmir, 
Sir Creek, Siachen, Wullar barrage, and even concerns such as trade. These will still need to be 
addressed to satisfy both sides under the “overwhelming-disparity scenario” brought about by 
the Indo-US alliance, in the same way as they need to be addressed today. Increased disparity 
vis-à-vis India will not automatically force Pakistan to concede on these issues.  
The situation is compounded if one predicts India’s reaction to the increased disparity. 
India is likely to see the US backing as an assurance of a long-term quantitative shift in Indo-
Pak relations. As mentioned, to date, India is believed to have been held back from realising its 
true potential due to its conflict with Pakistan. The recent Indo-US alliance removes the 
compulsion for India to normalise with Pakistan. This is not to say peace with Pakistan will not 
remain in India’s interest. However, since India has now been accepted as a US ally without 
having to settle the Indo-Pak equation, the conflict with Pakistan at best becomes a minor 
irritant, which still needs to be tackled, but will not affect India diplomatically as it did earlier. 
Under such a situation, India would be more likely to adopt a tougher stance on key 
outstanding issues. 
The biggest shortcoming of the US move towards New Delhi is that it seems to have been 
conceived in a vacuum. Washington has ignored all collateral benefits that were possible from 
such a US offer. For instance, with an offer of this magnitude, the US could easily have pushed 
India harder to hasten the Indo-Pak peace process. Ignoring all conditionalities that were 
earlier imposed on India means that the potential benefit of ensuring South Asian stability as a 
by-product has now disappeared altogether. The US-Indo alliance and the US role in Pak-Indo 
rapprochement have unfortunately been divorced from each other. What was needed was for 
the US to find a middle ground between a zero-sum relationship with Pakistan and India, and a 
complete divorce between Indo-US and Pak-US relations. The pattern followed by the new 
Indo-US alliance suggests that Washington has moved from one extreme to the other. For the 
long-term, this spells trouble for the region as a whole. 
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The South Asian alliance structure: examining the future 
An analysis of the Indo-US deal’s impact would remain limited if the wider South Asian region 
is not studied. In this section, we consider other South Asian countries, primarily China in the 
equation. In a broader regional context, South Asia is likely to fall prey to global power politics. 
The changing structure of alliances in the region will peg regional countries against one another 
in support of their allies. The Sino-Indian-Pakistan triad holds the key in this regard. 
The nuclear deal and other military assistance programs from Washington are set to buffer 
China in the years to come. At the same time, the year 2006 has been declared the year of Sino-
Indian friendship. China and India have managed to move away from their territorial 
differences and are focusing on economic cooperation to advance their ties. The Sino-India 
model of cooperation is now perceived to have developed enough economic stake for the two 
sides to endure a long-term alliance.  
The current trend in Sino-Indian relations has tended to obscure one important factor. 
While the two sides have tremendous economic stakes, their geo-strategic interests and global 
alliances are bound to clash over the long run [8]. The economic stakes may well keep them 
away from outright confrontation, but a clash of strategic interests is sure to force them to 
continue employing various coercive diplomatic tactics against one another. The bottom line is 
that India and China are both looking to create hegemony over overlapping (if not the same) 
regions. While China’s stature has already started to peg the world’s super power against it, 
India has chosen to play on this rivalry to develop its own stake in a relationship with the US  
The Indo-US deal clearly spells trouble for China. While the official Chinese reaction to 
the deal was mellow, it is certainly in Beijing’s interest to undermine the development. China is 
as worried as anyone on the possibility of the nuclear deal benefiting India in its military 
program and would look to avoid any such possibility, even if it is not an immediate threat. 
China’s interest in this case complements Pakistan’s. The latter is as adamant as China to 
dampen the deal for reasons explained in the previous section. Pakistan has done well since 
9/11 to ferment ties with the US without allowing its relationship with Beijing to be 
compromised substantially. It therefore presents itself as an open option for Beijing to 
collaborate on the attempt.  
That Pakistan and China attempted to stall the deal before it was approved should thus 
come as no surprise. Prior to the finalisation of the Indo-US deal, Pakistan and China leaked 
reports of a deal that allowed Pakistan to purchase six to eight nuclear reactors from China. 
The real value of the news of Sino-Pakistani collaboration in this sphere was its timing. Clearly, 
this was not a coincidence. The two sides were looking to see if such a stance could compel the 
Bush administration to rethink the deal.  
Equally logical is the fact that the two sides are currently strategising on how to minimise 
the impact of the Indo-US relationship. In this regard, the Gwadar port represents the new 
‘Great Game’ in the region [9]. Pakistan has accorded China sovereign rights at the Gwadar 
port, which implies Chinese naval presence will be used to undermine the Indo-US goal of 
complete supremacy of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf regions. Beijing and Islamabad are 
also extending the Karakoram Highway to connect both countries directly with Central Asia. 
In short, while the deal cannot be undercut any longer, Beijing and Islamabad seem to have 
decided that a strategic alliance to check the Indo-US predominance in the region is the best 
recourse if the two are to be denied added influence in the region [10].  
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Currently, China is not willing to pull back on its upturn in relations with India. But if 
India gets to the point where it can threaten China, militarily as well as economically, China’s 
interest surely will prompt it to continue propping up Pakistan, at least militarily. This might 
lead to a situation under which the renewed arms build up cum chain reaction scenario 
discussed above would become a reality. The resulting strategic balance would be unstable. 
As for the rest of South Asia, the additional leverage provided to India by this new 
relationship will likely harden its stance further against smaller South Asian countries in 
contentious security and economic issues. Given that mutual suspicion of SAARC members 
towards India is a key factor in South Asia’s dismal integration record, the goal of regional 
integration is likely to remain elusive for the foreseeable future.   
So what does the ‘alliance maze’ mean for the future? The most likely scenario is as 
follows. On a bilateral level, the Sino-Indian relationship will remain cordial in the short to 
medium term. However, China will continue to build stronger ties with Pakistan and signal to 
New Delhi as well as Washington of Islamabad’s supreme importance from time to time [11]. 
The future of the Pakistan-US relationship is a big question mark but in all likelihood the two 
will continue to collaborate, albeit in an increasingly disparate framework. However, Islamabad 
would draw its lines clearly, ensuring that US pressure does not lead to the undermining of the 
Sino-Pak relationship. The overarching alliance structure will not conform to the bilateral 
arrangements. Within the next decade, the strategic balance of power in South Asia is likely to 
be defined by an Indo-US versus Sino-Pak alliance.  
Conclusions 
This paper does little more than simply putting the Indo-US nuclear deal in a broader 
perspective. The deal in itself is unique and is a testimony to the potential for a lasting Indo-US 
relationship. Given its wide-ranging implications, it is likely to affect various actors/issues 
differently. While a number of individual states are sure to gain from the development, the 
shear weight of the harm caused to the global non-proliferation regime due to the deal tilts the 
balance of the cost-benefit equation in favor of the ‘cost’ side. In essence, the non-proliferation 
goal has been compromised to benefit the national interests of two powerful states, one being 
the leader of a unipolar world.  
Interesting dynamics are likely to emerge out of this deal in terms of regional relations. 
The Indo-Pak relationship might undergo a significant reassessment over the long run, 
especially in Islamabad, which is a clear loser from this deal. The most obvious recourse for 
Pakistan would be to further strengthen the Sino-Pakistan relationship, which is likely to be 
welcome by Beijing given its uneasiness with the Indo-US deal. Overall, the regional scenario 
will see states involved in counter-alliances, virtually quashing the South Asian dream of 
regional integration. The next decade is likely to be marked by considerable strengthening of 
the Indian military and economic might, partly driven at the behest of US assistance, and a 
growing Sino-Pakistan relationship to act as a counter balance. At the same time, the US-
Pakistan and Sino-Indian relations are unlikely to come to a head.  
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Notes 
1. This paper builds upon a string of articles written by the author in The Friday Times, 
Pakistan during 2005-2006. 
2. See Esther Pan, ‘The US-India Nuclear Deal’, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2006. 
3. Praful Bidwai, ‘Snags Surface in India-US Nuclear Deal’, Antiwar Online, February 2006. 
4. See Moeed Yusuf, ‘Washington’s Non-Proliferation Focus is Misplaced’, The Friday 
Times, October 2004. 
5. See Robert Einhorn, ‘Should the US Sell Nuclear Technology to India? – Part I’, Yale 
Global Online, November 2005. 
6. The Pakistan-India relationship is discussed in detail in the next section. 
7. A number of prominent analysts in Pakistan have started taking this line. The author 
agrees with the point of view and has argued along these lines since 2003. 
8. For an apt argument in support of this thesis, see Ejaz Hadier, ‘Enter the Dragon’, The 
Friday Times, December 1, 2006. 
9. ‘Gwadar’ is a port city on Pakistan’s south-west coast. Modern port facilities, which also 
carries immense strategic importance given its geographical proximity to the Persian Gulf 
and Strait of Hurmuz, is currently under construction in Gwadar. 
10. For an extensive discussion of Pak-China relations, see Urvashi Aneja, ‘Pakistan-China 
Relations: Recent Developments (Jan-May 2006)’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
Special Report No. 26, June 2006. 
11. The Chinese president took this diplomatic stance during his State visits to India and 
Pakistan in late-November 2006. 
 
